Weird argument against Kalam Cosmological Argument

I'm not a fan of William Lane Craig. I think he is overly apologetic, and his famous Kalam Cosmological Argument(hereafter, KCA) is eventually failed. But I also think that many counterarguments about KCA in internet is failed.

Today I will examine some of that failures, from Tippling Philosopher.


* Original Link

The Kalam Cosmological Argument and William Lane Craig #1 (Revisited)

The Kalam Cosmological Argument and William Lane Craig #2 (revisited)

Before starting the discussion, caution; I'm Korean, so English is my second language. As a result, my word might be rough and my understanding of argument might be poor. And I'm also just a interested layman, So my word is not philosophically proper.


1. Against Causality


In his blog Tippling Philosopher, author Jonathan MS Pearce gave us two argument against KCA. This two argument is intended to show that KCA is circular argument by examining the notion of 'causality' and 'everything.' And the first argument is designed to show that KCA is circular argument because the notion of causality is different with Craig's view. Then what is causality in Pearce's view? He thought that there is no other cause, but only the beginning of the universe:

In other words, there is only one cause. The universe at the Big Bang (or similar).

To justify this claim, He argued that causality is a big continuum of cause and effect, so we can't arbitrarily cut it and say this is the cause of some event. In his view, cause of one event is not some event, but circumstance behind that event. He tried to show this by analogy:

With this in mind, let us look at causality and the problems with it. Let me analogise to make the point as clear as possible: 

Smith is driving along the road over the speed limit. He is tired due to a heavy work schedule and a deadline which meant a lack of sleep the night before and is late for a meeting. One of his favourite songs comes on the radio and he starts singing along to it. On the pavement (sidewalk) a drunk man falls over into a bin which the Council had just put in place to improve the cleanliness of the town. The bin is knocked off its stand and rolls into the road. Smith sees the bin late as his attention is distracted. He swerves, to avoid it. At the same time, a boy is trying to cross the road without looking. Smith is swerving into him and has to reverse his swerve significantly the other way, hitting a pothole in the poorly maintained road. This sends the car out of his control and onto the pavement. Jones, who had been walking by, slips on some soapy water draining from the carwash he is walking past. Whilst picking himself up, Smith’s car mounts the pavement, hits Jones and kills him instantly. What is the cause of Jones’ death? 

This is a very difficult, but standard causal question. The universe is not an isolation of one cause and one effect. It is a matrix of cause and effect with each effect being causal further in the continuum. One could say that the impact of the car on Jones’ head kills him. But even then, at what nanosecond of impact, what degree of the force killed him? This is arbitrarily cutting off the causal continuum at 1, half or quarter of a second before the effect (Jones’ death). Having said that, the cause could be said to be the lack of oxygen to the brain, or the destruction of his vital organs. We could also accuse the bin, the drunk or anything else as being a cause. 

As a result, I would posit that the cause of Jones’ death is one long continuum which cannot be arbitrarily sliced up temporally. As such, it stretches back to, say, the Big Bang – the start of the causal chain. In terms of free will, we call this the causal circumstance. Because the universe is one big causal soup, I would claim that any effect would be the makeup of the universe at any one point, like a snapshot. This makeup cannot be sliced up arbitrarily, but is the entire connected matrix of ‘causes and effect’ (for want of a better term) since the Big Bang. 

The problem is, this argument from analogy is unsuccessful. Theists can admit causality is not a single, isolated connection of events, but a whole matrix of connection between events that necessarily stretches back to the beginning of the universe or the first cause, and cannot be arbitrarily slice up. In fact, that is the natural conclusion of premises in the KCA and the Argument from First Cause(hereafter, AFC). Both arguments say that if something exist(or begin to exist), then It must have a cause. That means if something exists, then its cause must exist, then that cause's cause also must exist, and then that cause's cause's cause also must exist, and so on. So if these two theistic argument's premises are true, then the whole causal chain must exist, and their connection cannot be arbitrarily sliced up. In this subject, I think that Pearce misunderstood Craig's notion of causality, because later he said:

Craig is incorrect, in my opinion, in saying that the cause of B hitting E is the immediate isolated efficient cause just before t5 (t4).

As far as I know, Craig or any other theists never say that efficient cause is isolated, or must be isolated. On the contrary, as I stated in the above, they usually argue that any event must be connected by the causal chain. And even more than that, they also can admit that you really want the whole picture of causality of one event, then you must see the whole connection of cause and effect which starts from the beginning of the universe, which Pearce put it, "Causal circumstances." But, they will argue, that these facts don't make the beginning of the universe is the only cause. they will say that these facts just show us that the relation of cause and effect is complicated and cannot be broken. To clarify this objection, I'll give you an example which is simplifying the causal relationship:

(1) Suppose there are only 12 events in the universe: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L.
(2) A causes B & C, B & C cause D & E & F, D & E & F cause G & H & I & J & K, G & H & I & J & K cause L.

In this situation, event L's whole causal circumstance is A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K and all of these events are connected to event A. But as you can see, that fact doesn't imply that event A is the only cause or following statement "event K is a cause of event L" is false. We can freely say that "A is a cause of D" or "B is a cause of E" and so on.

So, if Pearce wants to succeed his argument that there is just one cause, then he must show us more than that analogy. And I think his additional argument is that the causal circumstance is not a set of connected events, but just an event. This means that there are no B or C or D, but just A. In this perspective, B, C, D, and the other events are not actual events, but aspects of the event A. So the causal chain is indivisible not because their connection is necessary, but their connection doesn't exist. That's why he called the causal chain "the causal continuum", or the universe is "the causal soup." However, if this is true, then there is not just one cause, but also there is just one effect. Why? because exactly same argument can be set to the effect(B, C, D are not effects of the A, but the aspects of the one effect, L). Pearce knew this, and saying:

What this amounts to is the notion that there is only one cause, and even this is open for debate. The creation event sets in motion one long, interconnected continuum of causality. What I am implying here, then, is that there is only one effect. This means that the idea that ‘everything’ or ‘every effect’ as it can be synonymously denoted is incoherent since there is only one effect.

But the impact of this argument is worse than he thought. It's not just saying there is only a cause and only a effect. According to this argument, this cause and effect is also indivisible, because this two are not events but aspects of one event. So, there are actually no cause and effect in this universe, just the beginning and the ending of the one event. Why is this worse? Well, if there is only one event in the universe, then there can't be any temporal thing within the universe. Because if any of that thing exist, then it begins to exist and ceases to exist in the universe and, even worse, interacts with the other part of the universe during its whole life. This implies that there are more than one event. As a result, If he wants to show us that this argument succeeds, then he must give us some successful arguments that show us there are only things that exist from the beginning of the universe. This leads us to Pearce's second argument.


2. Against the concrete being

In the second argument, Pearce argued that 'everything' is actually a thing, the universe. He quoted from philosopher Adolf Grünbaum's essay "The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology" and stated:

Now I will set out, as Grünbaum hints at, to show that “everything” is a term which also refers to a singular object.

To show this, He adopted nominalism:

The nominalist adopts a position which denies the existence of universals, such as redness or gardenership, and claims that only individuals or particulars exist. Conceptualism or conceptual nominalism, on the other hand, is a position which claims that universals only exist within the framework of the thinking (conceiving) mind. Most philosophers agree that the part of the definition of abstracts is that they are causally inert. This means that, at best, the abstract label is unable to have causal power anyway (regardless of its ontology).

This seems weird. Why? Because as he explained, nominalism is a philosophical view about abstract objects, not concrete objects. But if you want to show us that there is only a thing in the universe, then you must argue about concrete objects, not abstract objects. In fact, as far as I know, most proponents of KCA or any other cosmological arguments don't much care about abstract objects, because as Pearce said, they are causally inert.

Then, why did Pearce think that nominalism supports his argument? I think because he actually thinks there are no concrete beings, but by other argument which is not explicitly presented in his post. What is that argument? Well, we can see its remnants here and there:

… So how do I establish that the only thing which has begun to exist is the universe? We may think that things like tables, chairs, humans, rocks, lemmings and so on exist. Well, they do in one sense (an arrangement of matter / energy), but in the sense of the abstract labels of ‘rock’ or ‘chair’, they are exactly that, abstract labels. …

… What this means is that what makes the chair, the molecules and atoms, already existed in some other form or other before the ‘chair’ came to be. So the matter or energy did not ‘begin to exist’. This merely leaves the label of ‘chair’. …

… You see, once we strip away the labels and concepts, all we have left is matter and energy which is only ever involved in what has been called transformative creation, meaning it doesn’t begin to exist, but is being constantly being reformed throughout time. It only began to exist at the Big Bang or similar (in Craig’s model). …

It seems to me that he thought there are no concrete objects because they are just "arrangements of matter / energy", or results of "transformative creation." To him, concrete objects are all made of pre-existing matter and energy, so they don't actually begin to exist. What actually begins to exist is matter and energy which is always exist from the beginning of the universe and abstract objects that label the arrangement. So in his view, if we can deny the existence of abstract objects (nominalism), then all we have is just matter and energy.

Does this argument succeeds? Well, I think not. The fact that something is made of pre-existing matter and energy doesn't necessarily mean that thing doesn't begin to exist. So it needs a hidden premise which is crucial to its success, and I think that hidden premise is, "If two things are made of the same matter and energy, then that two things are actually a same thing." But this hidden premise seems to be false, because there are plenty of examples which are made of same matter and energy but has significantly different ontological status, so can't be a same thing.

Let me start with a simple example. Hydrogen and oxygen are both flammable. But If two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom are combined, there is a water molecule, which is inflammable. This means because of so called "arrangement", something can have very different, even opposite ontological properties to pre-existing material. How about the difference between coal and diamond? both are made of same matter, carbon. but their properties are significantly different because of their structure. This means that "transformative creation" not only makes different properties between the pre-existing matter and the output, but also makes different properties between the output.

All of above examples shows us that pre-existing matter and arrangements of that matter have different ontological status like properties, dispositions, and categories. And because this ontological status is the crucial factor to differentiate something from the others, this significant difference of ontological status means that there are concrete objects and "transformative creation" makes them begin to exist. This implies that there are at least more than one thing exist within the universe.

This fact not only implies that Pearce's second argument fails, but also his concept of "transformative creation" is misguided. He thought it is some kind of alternative concept which can replace the causation. But considering what I argued above, it is more plausible to think that it is some kind of causation rather than its substitute. In fact, this idiosyncratic term "transformative creation" can be described Aristotle's more famous term, material cause. Material cause is the pre-existing matter that composes the output. Considering this, we can saw that "transformative causation" is just a causation which is involved with material cause.


3. Rediscovering causality

Now, back to the first argument. Under the analysis of the second argument, we can understand this argument more accurately. Pearce thought there is just one concrete object, universe. So in his view, there is nothing begin to exist and cease to exist, just the arrangement of ever-existing matter and energy. This implies actual causality doesn't exist, and "transformative creation" substitutes it. Therefore there is not only just a thing, but also a event. This kind of worldview was clearly shown by Pearce's second example:

Imagine there are 5 billiard balls A-E and nothing else. These came to exist at point t0 with an ‘introductory force’. At each point t1, t2 etc, every ball hits another ball. At point t5, B hits E at 35 degrees sending it towards C. Craig’s own point about causality seems to be this: the cause for B hitting E at 35 degrees is the momentum and energy generated in B as it hits E. That is his ‘efficient cause’. My point is this: the cause of B hitting E is at t0. No cause has begun to exist or has been created out of nothing. The causes transform – what is called transformative creation. So the cause of B hitting E is: 

B firing off at t0 and hitting A at t1, the causal circumstance meaning it rebounds off A to hit D at t2, meaning the causal circumstance rendering it inevitable that it hits A again at t3…. And then it hits E at t5 at 35 degrees. 

The cause is the casual circumstance at t5. This is identical to the causal circumstance in free will discussions – that determinism entails the cause of an action to the first cause of the Big Bang. The causal circumstance is everything up until the moment t5 as well as all the factors at the moment just prior to t5 (at t4). Craig is incorrect, in my opinion, in saying that the cause of B hitting E is the immediate isolated efficient cause just before t5 (t4). 

Now, in this example, the term transformative creation pops up. This is something which will be examined in the next objection. In sum, this example shows that one cannot arbitrarily quantise causality; one cannot cut it up into discrete chunks since it is, in reality, one long, continual causal chain, unbroken.

But, as was stated above, there is no reason to think only the universe is a thing. On the contrary there are many examples that arrangements of matter and energy have significantly different ontological status each other, so there is plenty of reasons to think more than one concrete object within the universe. As a result, it is more plausible to think that there are more than one event, and that "transformative creation" is actually the term which describes causation involved with material cause. So, because his second argument fails, his first argument also fails.


4. Conclusion

In conclusion, both of Pearce's argument against KCA fails. His second argument which states there is just a thing, universe, fails because his argument against abstract objects is off the mark and his argument against concrete objects is weak. His first argument which states there is just a cause implies there is just an event and as a result its success is entirely on a success of the second argument. So, as I mentioned above, his first argument is failed because his second argument fails.